ABSTRACT Cloud computing enables customers with limited computational resources to outsource their huge computation workloads to the cloud with massive computational power. However, in order to utilize this computing paradigm, it presents various challenges that need to be addressed, especially security. As eigen-decomposition (ED) and singular value decomposition (SVD) of a matrix are widely applied in engineering tasks, we are motivated to design secure, correct, and efficient protocols for outsourcing the ED and SVD of a matrix to a malicious cloud in this paper. In order to achieve security, we employ efficient privacy-preserving transformations to protect both the input and output privacy. In order to check the correctness of the result returned from the cloud, an efficient verification algorithm is employed. A computational complexity analysis shows that our protocols are highly efficient. We also introduce an outsourcing principle component analysis as an application of our two proposed protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing provides convenient on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computational resources [3] , [4] . It refers to both the applications delivered as services over the Internet and the hardware and software systems that provide those services [5] . Cloud computing possesses a majority of advantages, such as access to on-demand resources, location independent and easy maintenance [5] - [7] .
Computation outsourcing is one of the main services of the cloud paradigm, where the customer can outsource their intensive computational tasks to cloud with massive computational resources [8] . Instead of setting up and maintaining their own infrastructures, the customers can economically share the massive computational power, storage, and even softwares of the cloud [9] . In spite of the tremendous benefits, outsourcing computation to a cloud also deprives customers' direct control to the computation process [10] , which inevitably brings in new challenges [11] , [13] , [22] .
The first challenge is security. Both the outsourced computation workloads and the results to these outsourced workloads may contain sensitive information. On the one hand, the privacy of outsourced problem which is referred to as the input privacy should be protected. Thus, customer has to encrypt the outsourced problem before sending it to cloud. On the other hand, the output privacy should be also protected. It requires that the cloud can not judge the correct result to the original problem from the result to the encrypted one. The second challenge is verifiability. Verification is important because the cloud may behave unfaithfully and return an incorrect result. For example, for the massive computation tasks, there is huge incentive for the cloud to be lazy and to return a random result if the customer can not tell whether the result is correct or not [14] . Even if the cloud performs faithfully, some inevitable software bugs, hardware failures in cloud may also affect the correctness of the result. So without verification mechanism, the customer can not expect the correctness of the result returned by the cloud. Last but not the least, efficiency is also a challenge should be taken into consideration. The amount of local computation performed by the customer should be substantially reduced, compared to the amount of computation of solving the original problem by its own. Otherwise, it is meaningless for the customer to seek help from the cloud. What's more, it is desirable that the overload of the cloud needed in solving the encrypted problem is comparable to the overload needed in solving the original problem.
Thus, it is necessary to design a protocol to ensure the outsourced computation to be secure, verifiable, and efficient. In recent years, some practical protocols for computation outsourcing were presented for different problems. Two outsourcing protocols for solving large-scale linear equations were proposed in [14] and [17] . In [20] , an outsourcing protocol was designed for image reconstruction. Outsourcing protocols for linear programming, quadratic programming, and convex optimization were introduced in [21] , [15] , and [16] , respectively. In [9] , [18] , and [19] , secure outsourcing protocols for computation of matrix inversion, matrix multiplication and matrix determinant were developed, respectively. In [22] , an outsourcing protocol for linear regression was introduced.
Eigen-decomposition and singular value decomposition of matrix are two essential computations in linear algebra [1] . They also have broad applications in engineering fields, such as signal processing [23] and face recognition [24] . However, running these kinds of matrix decomposition algorithms costs a lot of computational resources when the size of matrix is large. Thus, it is attractive for the customer with limited computational ability to outsource ED or SVD of large size matrix to the cloud. Motivated by this, we develop respectively two secure, verifiable, and efficient outsourcing protocols for ED and SVD of matrix in this paper.
We regard our main contributions as follows: We design respectively two protocols to outsource two common computational tasks: eigen-decomposition and singular value decomposition of matrix. We show that the proposed protocols can simultaneously achieve goals of security, cheating resistance, and efficiency. We also introduce an application of our two protocols in outsourcing principle component analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present some mathematical background. In section 3, we introduce the system model and our design goals. Then we provide the detailed techniques of our outsourcing protocol for eigen-decomposition of matrix in section 4. In section 5, we give the related analysis on outsourcing protocol for eigen-decomposition of matrix. In section 6, we present our outsourcing protocol for singular value decomposition of matrix. The performance of the two protocols is evaluated in section 7. We introduce an application of our two proposed protocols in outsourcing principle component analysis in section 8. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in section 9.
II. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND A. EIGEN-DECOMPOSITION
Given an n × n symmetric matrix A, it can be diagonalized using its eigenvalues and eigenvectors [1] as follows:
where Q is an n × n orthonormal matrix whose columns are orthonormal eigenvectors of matrix A, and is a diagonal matrix with the elements of its main diagonal being the eigenvalues of matrix A.
B. SINGULAR VALUE DECOMPOSITION
Given a general m × n matrix A, we can use singular value decomposition to diagonalize it as follows:
where u i (m × 1) and v i (n × 1) are singular vectors, σ i > 0 is singular value. The singular vector u i is the eigenvector of matrix AA T and the singular vector v i is the eigenvector of matrix A T A. All the r numbers of u i are orthonormal vectors, so are the r numbers of v i . The singular value σ i is the square root of eigenvalue of matrix A T A or AA T .
C. PERMUTATION AND KRONECKER DELTA FUNCTION
Permutation is about the act of rearranging all the elements of a set into another order. It is well studied in algebra and group theory [2] . In this paper, we view permutation as a bijection function from set S to itself. Cauchy's two-line notation is well adopted to represent the permutation, which is written as
There are two lines in this notation, where the first line lists the preimage element, and the second line lists each element's image. Here, |S| = n, s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n are the n different elements of the set S, so are the s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n . Thus, we can use a bijection function ψ(s i ) to represent permutation. Kronecker delta function δ xy is widely used in engineering, which is defined as
Lastly, we introduce the matrix P which is named as key matrix in this paper. We define it based on permutation and Kronecker delta function. First, we pick a set of random numbers ω 1 ,. . . , ω n from random space = {−1, 1}. Then, the key matrix P can be constructed as follows Both the domain and the range of the bijection function ψ in Eq. (5) are the set S = {1, 2, . . . , n}. By this definition, only one entry is not equal to 0 in each column and each row of P. We can easily find that the key matrix is orthonormal for the fact that every column of matrix P is perpendicular and normalized.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS
The security threats faced by the computation outsourcing primarily come from the malicious behavior of the cloud. In general, there are mainly two cloud models in outsourcing: semi-honest model and malicious model [25] . The semihonest model was assumed in many previous researches [26] , where the cloud does obey the protocol, but it intends to analyze the encrypted input sent by the customer and the output produced by itself to learn sensitive information. While the malicious cloud may disobey the protocol and return a random answer to save computational resources hoping not to be detected by the customer in the meanwhile. Therefore, the customer has to verify the result to resist the cloud's cheating behavior. In this paper, we assume that the cloud is malicious, and the communication between the cloud and the customer is reliable.
We consider the system model of outsourcing ED/SVD of matrix involving two parties, as illustrated in Fig.1 . One party is the customer, who is with limited computational ability, but has a large scale ED/SVD task to solve. The other is the cloud, who has powerful computational capacity and large amount of storage. Since the customer is lack of computational resources, it is beyond its ability to carry out such intensive computation locally. So the customer resorts to the cloud for help to handle the ED/SVD task. To preserve the privacy, the customer encrypts the original matrix A into an encrypted one B with secret keys K . Instead of sending the original matrix A to the cloud directly, the customer sends the encrypted matrix B. When receiving the encrypted matrix B, the cloud performs ED/SVD to diagonalize matrix B. Then the cloud provides the result to the customer. After getting the result, the customer verifies whether the result returned is correct or not. If the result is correct, then the customer decrypts it to get the ultimate decomposition solution of the original matrix A. Otherwise, the customer claims the result returned is wrong and requires the cloud to compute it again.
In order to enable practical outsourcing of ED/SVD, our protocols should achieve the following goals: 1) Security. The protocols can protect both the input and output privacy. No sensitive information can be derived by the cloud during performing the ED/SVD computation. 2) Verifiability. The protocols should also ensure that customer can verify whether the returned result is correct or not. If both the cloud and the customer behave faithfully, the customer can get the correct solution.
At the same time, no incorrect output generated by the cloud can pass through verification with non-negligible probability. 3) Efficiency. On the one hand, the customer should have a relative low amount of local computation, compared to computing ED/SVD of matrix directly. On the other hand, the computational overhead of the cloud is within the comparable burden on solving the ED/SVD task which means that the overhead introduced by our protocols should not be large. There are five modules which respectively correspond to the five rectangles in our model:
1) Key generation: The customer randomly generates the key K which is used to encrypt the original matrix A. 2) Encryption: The customer encrypts the original matrix A using the key K . We use matrix multiplication and linear mapping to transform the original matrix A into an encrypted one B. 
IV. OUTSOURCING PROTOCOL DESIGN FOR EIGEN-DECOMPOSITION OF MATRIX
In this section, we design a secure, verifiable, and efficient outsourcing protocol for eigen-decomposition of matrix. The above mentioned five modules are described detailedly in the following. The outsourcing protocol for singular value decomposition of matrix is introduced in section 6.
A. KEY GENERATION
In this module, customer randomly generates a key matrix as below:
Here m i is randomly generated from the space which is defined in the section of Mathematical Background, and ψ(i) is a bijection function.
B. ENCRYPTION
In outsourcing eigen-decomposition (ED) of matrix, the customer wants to get the eigenvalues and corresponding orthonormal eigenvectors of matrix A. In the meantime, the customer expects that neither matrix A nor its eigenvalues and eigenvectors are exposed to the cloud. Hiding the former is called input privacy preserving and hiding the latter is named output privacy preserving.
1) PROTECT INPUT PRIVACY
In outsourcing ED of matrix, the input to the cloud is matrix A, which may contain sensitive information. To hide it, the customer first chooses α and s from real number set randomly. Then the customer encrypts the original matrix A as follows:
where I is the identity matrix. We can easily find that the eigenvectors of A and A are the same, and the relationship between the eigenvalue λ of A and the eigenvalue λ of A is
It can be proved as follows: supposing λ and x are eigenvalue and corresponding eigenvector of matrix A, then
which completes our proof. Since the cloud does not have the exact value of α and s. If the customer sends A to the cloud for ED, the privacy of matrix A and eigenvalues of A is preserved. However the eigenvectors of matrix A and matrix A are the same which means the privacy of eigenvectors is not preserved. Therefore, we have to protect the eigenvectors from exposing to the cloud.
2) PROTECT OUTPUT PRIVACY
As described above, the privacy of eigenvalues have been protected already. Then we show the way to protect the privacy of eigenvectors by using key matrix M . First we let
Then Eq. (9) can be represented as follows:
We multiply both sides of Eq. (11) by M :
The second equation is because key matrix M is orthonormal. Finally Eq. (12) can be represented as follows:
where B = MA M T . The original matrix A is transformed into matrix B, and the relationship between them can be represented as (10), we know that the eigenvector x of matrix A is masked by key matrix M which contributes to protecting the privacy of eigenvector of matrix A.
As discussed above, the customer protects both the input and output privacy through the process of encryption. After the encryption, the customer outsources the matrix B to the cloud for ED. The cloud computes ED of matrix B, and returns two matrices Y and to the customer, where
Here, y 1 , y 2 , . . . y n is n numbers of orthonormal eigenvectors of matrix B. is a diagonal matrix and the elements of its main diagonal are n corresponding eigenvalues
Remark 1: We use the key matrix M instead of any other invertible matrix to encrypt the eigenvector x because this transformation can guarantee the eigenvectors of the original matrix are orthonormal as long as the eigenvectors returned from the cloud are orthonormal. For example, if y 1 and y 2 are two orthonormal eigenvectors, then x 1 = M T y 1 and x 2 = M T y 2 are also orthonormal because
C. VERIFICATION
After receiving the result returned from the cloud, the customer has to verify the result to resist the cheating behavior of the cloud. In order to ensure the correctness of the result Y and , the customer first checks whether is a diagonal matrix. If is a diagonal matrix, then the customer verifies whether
It is equivalent to verify whether
However, it costs O(n 3 ) time for the customer computing Y Y T if the customer verifies whether Eq. (16) holds. This is undesirable since the customer can spend the comparable time computing ED of matrix A directly by itself. In other words, there is no need for the customer to outsource the ED task.
Although generally handling result verification task is not easy, this task can be well addressed by adopting Freivalds' algorithm [27] , which is also applied for verification in [9] .
Based on Freivalds' algorithm, our verification algorithm is designed as follows:
is not a diagonal matrix 2: Output ''reject the wrong result''.
3:
End the algorithm. The customer randomly selects an n × 1 vector r whose every element is randomly generated from the two value set {0,1}. Output ''reject the wrong result''. 10: End the algorithm.
11:
end if 12: end for 13: Output ''accept the correct result''.
Here, we name the steps from 6 to 11 in Algorithm 1 as one round random checking, and we use the positive integer l to represent the total rounds of random checking by customer.
The customer accepts the result if it passes through the verification. Otherwise the customer declares that the result is wrong and requires the cloud to compute again.
D. DECRYPTION
If the result returned from the cloud passes through verification, the customer transforms it into the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of matrix A. As the relationship between eigenvalues of A and B are showed by Eq.(8), the customer can easily get the eigenvalues of matrix A by
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. As to the transformation of eigenvectors, the customer can use Eq.(10) to decrypt y to the eigenvectors x of matrix A. Then the matrix A can be decomposed as follows:
where
Now, the customer gets the result of eigen-decomposition of the original matrix A.
V. ANALYSIS OF OUTSOURCING PROTOCOL FOR EIGEN-DECOMPOSITION OF MATRIX
In this section, we show that our proposed outsourcing protocol for ED of matrix is secure, verifiable, and efficient.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) INPUT PRIVACY GUARANTEE
The original matrix A is encrypted into matrix B = M (αA + sI )M T , where M is a key matrix, α and s are two random real numbers. As we can see above, the original matrix A is encrypted by two phases:
Phase 1: The linear transformation:
The transformation of reordering elements:
In Phase 1, α and s are randomly selected from the real number set R. This implies that even if the cloud has the correct matrix A . It costs the cloud |R| 2 times to recover the original matrix A by brute-force attack, where |R| is the number of elements in the real set R.
In Phase 2, the matrix A is reordered by matrix M as follows:
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Eq. (20) shows that A is masked by the permutation function π and the random numbers m i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). There are (n!) cases of the permutation function π and 2 possibility of every m i . Thus, even the cloud has the matrix B, the expecting times of brute-force attack to recover the matrix A is 2 n (n!), which is definitely a non-polynomially bounded quantity in terms of n.
Considering the above analysis, we can draw a conclusion that the input privacy is protected by the two phases shown before.
2) OUTPUT PRIVACY GUARANTEE
The cloud computes the eigen-decomposition of matrix B, thus the cloud knows the eigenvalue λ and the corresponding eigenvector y. We respectively show our protocol protect the privacy of both the eigenvalue and eigenvector.
The relationship between the eigenvalue of matrix A and the eigenvalue of matrix B is showed by Eq. (8) . Without knowing the real numbers α and s, the cloud can not get the eigenvalue of matrix A.
The relationship between the eigenvector of the original matrix A and the eigenvector of the matrix B is showed in Eq.(10). It is obvious that x is well masked by the key matrix M . As discussed above, it costs 2 n (n!) times for the cloud to get matrix M . Thus without knowing the matrix M , the cloud can not recover the eigenvector x from y.
Based on the above analyses, we draw a conclusion that our proposed protocol protects both the input privacy and the output privacy.
B. VERIFICATION ANALYSIS
The way to verify the result is showed in section 4.3. In this section, we prove that our proposed protocol has robust cheating resistance. Our proof procedure consists of two steps.
First of all, we prove that any correct result returned from the cloud can pass through the verification successfully. If the cloud behaves faithfully, then the returned result Y Y T is equal to B. Thus, in every round of random checking, no matter what r is, V is a zero vector which can pass through the verification. Therefore, any correct result can pass through the verification successfully.
Secondly, we show that any wrong result returned from a cheating cloud can not pass through the verification with a non-negligible probability. If the returned matrix is not a diagonal matrix, the customer claims the result is wrong directly. Then the probability of accepting the wrong result is 0. When is a diagonal matrix, we now prove that our protocol can resist the wrong result with a high probability.
Our verification algorithm is based on the Freivalds' algorithm [27] . The error analysis on Freivalds' algorithm shows the probability of the wrong result passing through the verification is less than 1 2 l [9] , [27] . In other words, the probability of the wrong result passing through verification decreases exponentially with the increase of l. In fact, the size of l is a tradeoff between cheating resistance and the efficiency of our proposed protocol. A larger l means a lower verification failure probability but with a higher computational overhead for the customer.
C. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
We analyze the efficiency of our proposed protocol in this section. In our system model, there are four operations performed by the customer, including key generation, encryption, verification and decryption. We analyze the computational complexity of these four operations individually.
First of all, we focus on the key generation operation which is introduced in section 4.
The overall task is to generate the key matrix M whose computational complexity is O(n).
Secondly, we analyze the computational complexity of the encryption operation which transforms the original matrix A into matrix B, where
It is obvious that the most time-consuming operation is multiplication between key matrix M and A. It costs O(n 2 ) time to compute B, according to Eq.(20).
Thirdly, we perform the analysis on verification operation. In every round of random checking, the customer has to compute Y (Y T r)−Br. The most complex computing operation is multiplication between matrix and vector which costs O(n 2 ) time. Since the verification operation runs l rounds of random checking, the overall computational complexity of verification is O(ln 2 ). For a large size matrix A, l is always greatly less than n (l n), thus the overall computational complexity of verification is O(n 2 ).
Lastly, if the result containing Y and returned from the cloud is correct, the customer then decrypts it to get the ultimate matrix and X as follows:
The most time-consuming computation is to compute M T Y . We can compute it in a similar way to computing matrix C in Eq. (19) . Therefore, the overall computational complexity of decryption is O(n 2 ). All in all, the overall computational overhead to the customer is O(n 2 ). In contrast, it always costs more than O(n 3 ) time to compute ED of matrix directly. There exists a great gap between O(n 2 ) and O(n 3 ) for a sufficiently large n. Thus, the customer can enjoy a great save of computational resources to outsource the ED task.
The overhead in the cloud side is the time consuming on performing the ED of a matrix with the same size as the original matrix. It implies that there is no additional computation introduced by our proposed protocol.
VI. OUTSOURCING PROTOCOL FOR SINGULAR VALUE DECOMPOSITION OF MATRIX
In this section, we introduce the outsourcing protocol for singular value decomposition of matrix, based on the previously proposed outsourcing protocol for eigen-decomposition of matrix.
According to the description in section 2.2, we summarize the steps of algorithm for SVD as follows:
Step 1: Computing the orthonormal eigenvector u i and eigenvalue of matrix AA T , then getting the singular value by extracting a square root from eigenvalue of AA T .
Step 2: Computing the orthonormal eigenvector v i of matrix A T A.
A. PROTOCOL DESIGN
Assuming that the customer wants to diagonalize a large m×n matrix A by SVD. But constrained by its computational resources, the customer has to resort to the cloud with massive computational power. In this paper, we assume that the cloud computes the singular value decomposition of matrix A following the two steps above.
1) ENCRYPTION
We let
to protect the input privacy, where α > 0 is a real number. The singular value of matrix A and matrix A is related as follows:
where σ is the singular value of A and σ is the singular value of A . This is because if σ is the singular value of A, we have
where u is the eigenvector of matrix AA T . Then
Thus, if the customer outsources the matrix A to the cloud for SVD, the singular values are hidden by random real number α. However, the singular vector u is exposed to the cloud as we can see in Eq. (25) . Hence, we have to protect the privacy of the singular vector. In order to mask the singular vector, the customer transforms the matrix A into
where P 1 (m×m) and P 2 (n×n) are two different key matrices. Then, if the customer outsources the matrix B for SVD, the cloud will first compute the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of matrix BB T . We assume
where u and σ are the eigenvector and the corresponding eigenvalue of matrix BB T , respectively. It leads to
Noticing that P 1 A A T P T 1 u = σ u , and multiplying both sides of the above equation by P T 1 , we have
By letting u = P T 1 u and substituting it into Eq. (29), we obtain
Thus, the singular vector u of matrix A is masked by the key matrix P 1 . Now we show how the eigenvector of matrix A T A is hidden. If
where v = P T 2 v . Thus, the singular vector v of matrix A is hidden by the key matrix P 2 .
2) VERIFICATION
So as to verify the result returned from the cloud, the customer first checks whether is a diagonal matrix, then verifies whether
The form of the above equation is similar to the form of Eq. (15) . Thus, the customer can use the same verification method as we presented in the section of outsourcing protocol for eigen-decomposition of matrix.
3) DECRYPTION
Since
then the customer can decrypt the result returned from the cloud as follows:
B. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
The analyses on security and verifiability of our protocol are similar to the analyses on outsourcing protocol for eigendecomposition of matrix. We omit them in this section and only introduce the analysis on the efficiency of our proposed protocol briefly. In encryption operation, the customer computes:
The computational complexity is O(n 2 ) since the multiplication between general matrix and key matrix can be computed efficiently.
In verification operation, the customer computes that whether Eq.(33) holds which requires O(n 2 ) time.
In decryption operation, the customer computes Eq.(35). The most time-consuming computation is matrix multiplication between general matrix and key matrix. The computational complexity is also O(n 2 ).
Overall, the computational complexity for the customer is O(n 2 ). The same as before, there is no additional computation introduced by our proposed protocol in the cloud side.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Analyses of the protocols in the above section have shown that the customer benefits a lot from outsourcing. We now assess the efficiency of the proposed outsourcing protocols with numerical experiments. In our experiments, both the client and cloud server computations are conducted on the same computer with an Intel Core 4 Duo processor running at 3.33GHz with 10GB RAM. We call the interface in Matlab 2010b to solve both eigen-decompostion and singular value decomposition of matrix. We do not consider the communication latency between the customer and the cloud in our experiments because the computation occupies the most running time.
Our goal is to test the efficiency of our proposed protocols. Definitions of parameters are as follows, t origin is the time the customer needed to run the algorithm for ED or SVD of matrix.
t customer is defined as the total time spent by the customer when outsourcing is chosen.
With these definitions, the customer's time gain can be calculated as t origin t customer , and we name it as performance gain. The performance gain should be greater than 1, otherwise there is no need for the customer to choose outsourcing.
We conduct two groups of experiments with l = 10 and l = 60. The choice for rounds of random checking l is a tradeoff between cheating resistance and efficiency. When l = 10, the computing overhead for the customer is less compared to the overhead when l = 60. But the probability of failure verification is about 1 2 10 . This probability is a little large in some applications, we name this case as 'efficiency priority case'. While l = 60, the probability of failure verification is 1 2 60 but with a higher computing overhead on the customer. We name this case as 'correct priority case'.
The performance of our outsourcing protocol for ED of matrix is shown in Table 1 and the performance of outsourcing protocol for SVD of matrix is shown in Table 2 .
It can be seen from the Tables that the performance gain is always greater than 1, which implies that the customer can save computational resources by outsourcing the computing task. With the increase of the matrix size, the customer's performance gain is getting larger. This is because the timeconsuming of our proposed protocols is O(ln 2 ). When the matrix size is small, l is comparable to the matrix size n which implies that the computational complexity of our protocols is almost O(n 3 ). Therefore, there is no great performance gain by choosing outsourcing. However, with the increase of the matrix size n, the computational complexity of our proposed protocols is O(n 2 ). This means the customer can enjoy a great performance gain. We also can see from the Tables that a larger l means less performance gain for the customer.
VIII. APPLICATION IN OUTSOURCING PCA
In this section, we introduce outsourcing principle component analysis as an application of our two proposed outsourcing protocols.
A. INTRODUCTION OF PRINCIPLE COMPONENT ANALYSIS
Principle component analysis is a technique widely used for applications such as dimensionality reduction, feature extraction, data compression [28] . We now introduce PCA briefly. Given a data set of {x n }, n = 1, 2, . . . M , where x n is a variable with dimensionality N . The goal of PCA is to project the data onto a space having dimensionality D < N while maximizing the variance of the projected data [28] which leads to the optimization problem as follows
where S is the covariance matrix which can be represented as follows:
wherex is the mean of x i . In order to solve the constrained optimization problem represented by Eq.(37), we introduce Lagrange multipliers λ i to construct a Lagrange function which is given by:
where λ i > 0. Taking the derivative of L(u i , λ i ) with respect to u i , and then setting it to 0, we have
Therefore, λ i is the positive eigenvalue of matrix S and its corresponding eigenvector is u i . Substituting Eq.(40) into Eq.(37), we get
Thus, the optimal projection is defined by the D eigenvectors u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u D (principle components) of the covariance matrix S corresponding to the D largest eigenvalues λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . λ D [28] .
B. OUTSOURCE THE PCA TASK TO THE CLOUD
Based on the above section, we know that the essence of the PCA is to find the D eigenvectors u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u D of the covariance matrix S corresponding to the D largest eigenvalues λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . λ D . Considering the heavy computation overhead, the customer prefers to outsource this task to the cloud. In this section, we show two methods of outsourcing PCA task based on our proposed two outsourcing protocols, respectively.
The first method is based on the outsourcing protocol for eigen-decomposition of matrix. Because the main task of PCA is to find the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of covariance matrix S, using the outsourcing protocol for eigen-decomposition of matrix becomes a very natural choice. However, before using this outsourcing protocol, the customer has to compute the covariance matrix S first. S is the result of the multiplication between two matrices which requires O(M 3 ) time. The computational complexity is comparable to the computational complexity of running eigendecomposition algorithm directly by customer. Thus, the customer can not use the outsourcing protocol for eigendecomposition of matrix direct unless it can compute the covariance matrix S more efficiently. Fortunately, the secure outsourcing protocol for matrix multiplication was proposed in [9] and its overhead in the customer side is O(M 2 ). Thus, the customer can first apply this outsourcing protocol to get the covariance matrix S. After getting the covariance matrix S, the customer applies our outsourcing protocol for matrix eigen-decomposition to get the eigenvectors corresponding to the largest D eigenvalues of S.
The second method of outsourcing PCA is based on the outsourcing protocol for SVD. Noticing that our goal is to find D largest eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors of the covariance matrix S. The eigenvectors of matrix S are the singular vectors of matrix X , and the eigenvalues of matrix S are the square of singular values of matrix X . Thus, the customer can outsource X for SVD to find the D singular vectors of matrix X and corresponding largest D singular values. The computational complexity is O(M 2 ) in the customer side.
C. EXPERIMENT ON OUTSOURCING PCA TASK
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of outsourcing PCA by conducting an experiment on compressing images. We here implement PCA by outsourcing SVD since it is more convenient. As the efficiency of outsourcing protocols has been studied in the previous section, here we focus on the security issue. We use an image dataset S img which contains 5000 images as our experiment data. The dataset is part of the Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) dataset [29] . Every image has 32 × 32 = 1024 pixels. We randomly select 100 images from the dataset to display in Fig. 2 . Our aim is to extract the features of the dataset by outsourcing PCA. Before outsourcing dataset S img to the cloud, the customer encrypts it into S enc first. After the encryption, the selected 100 images are shown in Fig. 3 . As we can see, Fig. 3 is greatly different from Fig. 2 , which means that the input privacy of dataset is well preserved. When the cloud receives the encrypted dataset S enc , it performs SVD and returns the result. In our experiment, we let the number of principle components be equivalent to 81 retaining the 49.3% covariance which means the 81 largest eigenvalues account for 49.3% of the summation of all eigenvalues. Now, we compress the original 5000 × 1024 dataset into a new 5000 × 81 dataset. The size of the new dataset is 81 1024 × 100% = 7.9% of the original size. Thus, we use the 7.9% data size to retain the 49.3% covariance of original data. The 81 principle components which are also named features computed by the cloud are shown in Fig. 4 . The customer decrypts them to get the ultimate features which are shown in Fig. 5 . Noticing the great differences between the features in the customer side and them in the cloud side, we can conclude that the output privacy is also well preserved.
In order to show the quality of the features which the customer gets, we first project the original dataset onto the direction of principle components and then recover them. After recovering, the selected 100 images are shown in Fig. 6 . Comparing Fig. 2 with Fig. 6 , we see that the general structure and appearance of the faces are well kept.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed two protocols for outsourcing eigen-decomposition and singular value decomposition of large-scale matrix to a malicious cloud. We have shown that both of the two outsourcing protocols fulfill the goals of security, cheating resilience and high efficiency. We also introduce outsourcing principle component analysis as an application of our proposed outsourcing protocols. Since eigen-decomposition and singular value decomposition of matrix are widely applied in scientific and engineering fields, the proposed protocols can not only be used individually, but also be used as building blocks to some more sophisticated problems.
In this paper, we use permutation-based data-masking method to hide the original matrix. This encryption method may suffer from the problem of ''zero item leakage'', which means that the cloud may know the number of zeros in the original matrix by counting the number of zeros in the encrypted matrix. Finding better protocol to avoid this problem is a future challenge. He is currently a Professor with the College of Information Science and Electronic Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China. His current research interests include statistical signal processing, wireless sensor network, and cloud computing. VOLUME 4, 2016 
